Two thousand twenty-six is an unprecedented year for space-based data infrastructure, with China recently announcing plans to launch Space-Based Data Centres (SBDCs). This follows recent updates from SpaceX, which has likewise signalled its intention to leverage outer space for high-powered Artificial Intelligence (AI) workloads using funds from its massive Initial Public Offering (IPO). Link to the previous article on SpaceX’s ambitions here. This denotes a current shift in global space ambitions overall. As you may recall from a previous post, SBDC’s are satellite‑borne computing platforms that perform high‑throughput data processing and AI workloads directly in orbit, rather than relying on terrestrial data centres. They use abundant solar power and the possible cooling advantages of space to enable large‑scale, energy‑efficient computation while reducing reliance on ground‑based infrastructure.
This comes as China’s energy needs continue to rise; in fact, according to a report by the International Energy Agency, electricity demand in China has grown faster than its GDP since 2020. Factors leading to this include energy-intensive manufacturing, which increases the need for air-conditioners. Other factors contributing to high energy usage are the proliferation of electric vehicles, expanding data centres, and the construction of 5G-related infrastructure.Also, China’s gross electricity demand soared to a whopping 10,000 terawatt-hours by the end of 2024,meaning more than one-third of global electricity consumption has been a direct result of economic growth in China. According to the IMF, we can expect this demand to increase by at least 6% in China over the next 3 years (2025-2027).This would mean that China would be commanding up to three times the annual electricity demand of Canada within the next 3 years.
As mentioned, launching SBDCs marks a watershed in the global space debate.SBDCs represent the next digital paradigm, with promises high-through-put, solar-powered, in-orbit AI processing that will outpace terrestrial data centres.China has committed to developing gigawatt-class orbital hubs, which also integrate reusable launch systems. What this signals is the nation's shift from launch-only capability to becoming a sovereign space orbit user.While this presents opportunity, it also directly challenges Western models and intensifies U.S.-China competition for leadership in space-enabled economies.
China has included SBDCs as part of its five-year space roadmap, which describes the intention to create a “space-based data economy”, one which will embed orbital computing, AI-enabled satellites, and gigawatt-class solar hubs into a unified industrial system. The roadmap, developed by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), envisions turning the People’s Republic into a leading global space power by 2045, and includes ambitions such as space tourism and the establishment of a spaceflight academy for future deep space exploration.
The current development is included in the space roadmap, which describes a transition from launch-centric capability to a full “space-based data economy”, one which will embed orbital computing, AI-enabled satellites, and gigawatt-class solar hubs into a unified industrial system. The roadmap, developed by the CASC,envisions turning the People’s Republic into a leading global space power by 2045, and includes ambitions such as space tourism and the establishment of a spaceflight academy for future deep space exploration.
This comes as the US continues to face mounting competition from China, as the latter pledges to use the next 10-20 years to achieve the Vision 2045. China hopes to become a global superpower through integrated civilian, military and commercial capabilities, aligning with the ambitions of its biggest ideological competitor. Leadership in space is a core strategic priority for China, and by 2049, it aims to establish itself as the world’s space leader, through, amongst others, the creation of lunar research outposts by 2036 as well as establishing human Mars landing systems by 2049.This vision forms a part of President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”,which is furthermore embedded in the CCP Constitution.The Constitution’s aims include spurring investments in space infrastructure, focusing on AI (and by extension, AI-enabled satellites) as part of the broader economic development strategy. It is thus hoped that the strategy will create a foundation for long-term deep-space exploration and resource utilization.
China has determined space as a strategic emerging industry. In light of this, the country has launched a Three-Body Computing constellation on a Long March-2D in May of 2025,deploying an initial 12 AI-computer satellites. This constellation represents the first tranche of a 2800-satellite mesh which will deliver ~1000 peta-operations per second (POPs) for real-time in-orbit AI processing. These satellites were launched by ADA Space as part of their “Star Compute” programme, the architecture of which will provide inter-satellite links of up to 100Gbps and 30TB of onboard storage. ADA Space (also known as Chengdu Guoxing Aerospace) leads spacecraft design and integration, while Zhejiang Lab co-develops the AI stack and defines the thousand-satellite scale architecture. The proposed deployment will consist of a phased rollout, starting with a testing phase (2025-2027), then progressing to a cost-reduction phase (2028-2030) and concluding with a scaling phase (2013-2033). The Republic will also be engaging parallel efforts to receive the appropriate authorisations, such as the required ITU spectrum filings for potentially hundreds of thousands of slots.
In order to file extensive spectrum and orbital slot requests ensures that China can make authorised use of outer space, which represents the province of all humankind. By reserving slots, China can launch satellites with the surety of leveraging the international treaty system to provide surety for its rights to use space for scientific and peaceful uses, as well as indemnifying itself from potential liability and later coordination conflicts. Subscribing to the multilateral system and thus joining the space community of nations, also places China in a position to negotiate on standards over key governance themes that may affect SBDCs, including Space Traffic Management (STM) and data.
However, some bottlenecks to fully achieving the above include the fact that China has yet to publish a comprehensive space law which speaks not only to the foundational principles of the space program, but also the regulations necessary for the privatisation of space endeavour. Such a policy would include clear prescriptions on the rights and obligations for launch, re-entry and liability, to name a few. Even spectrum allocation remains a somewhat “opaque" process, at least to the general public, ultimately hampering satellite-communications start-ups, for instance, and increasing the risk of disputes under the ITU framework, should damage or breach of duty ensue in the operation of their space objects.
It is common cause that legal uncertainty has the intended or unintended impact of deterring foreign investment,let alone, in the space community, creating friction with other space-faring nations that may choose to rely on transparent, treaty-based processes. China’s spectrum licences and ITU filings have been described as “opaque”, and representing barriers for commercial firms, yet recent intentions to submit filings with the ITU for megaconstellations may signal a desire to subscribe to international law processes. It is unfortunate however, that despite the comprehensive treaty system already in place,there remain gaps in key areas to support the scaling of SBDCs. Such areas that may need to be further developed include data governance, debris mitigation and especially the enforcement of private and investor-state disputes in space.
From an ethics standpoint, the potential of integrating AI-enabled orbital computers with dual‑use assets still raises concerns about international security and the weaponization of space‑based information.The Chinese State Council’s policies openly promote “civil‑military integration,” which may blur the line between commercial services (e.g., Earth‑observation analytics) and strategic intelligence.
From an environmental perspective, megaconstellations and SBDCs may further intensify orbital congestion and run the risk of prompting debris generation should there be a collision of any one of the many multistakeholder space systems operating in space, otherwise known as the Kessler syndrome. While SBDCs offer the benefits of space‑based cooling coupled with significantly more efficient solar power,the massive launch cadence to place thousands of satellites risks amplifying atmospheric emissions and fomenting a long‑term debris legacy that can only be mitigated through active removal or end‑of‑life de‑orbiting strategies.
To this end, and in conclusion, though without challenges, SBDCs have been woven into China’s national strategy and positioned as economic growth multipliers for the benefit of its citizens. It is clear China is making rapid strides to becoming technologically reliant whilst establishing its dominance in the international community, positioning itself as a direct competitor to U.S. initiatives (e.g., SpaceX’s own 1 million satellite SBDC programme). Various policy documents reinforce Beijing’s desire to achieve strategic autonomy in key subsectors of space by as early as 2045, yet policy and regulations have not yet met the pace of these developments. As discussed, these gaps in the law represent a pain point for investment and legitimacy in the private or multilateral system respectively.
If nations such as China can offset the environmental and launch costs associated with the utilisation of megaconstellations, perhaps the sustainability model that SBDCs represent may become more feasible. For now, stakeholders’ bet on space is characteristically bold of space endeavor, but continues to reflect a greater truth. If the world is to transition to the future digital economy will depend on the ability to overcome technical, legal and environmental barriers, and whether the international community will agree on the rules for this new frontier remains to be seen. For now, the story continues and the race is clearly on.